I describe protocols which assure the recipient of a quantum state that it has come from a sender with whom he has previously shared secret key. Their security is information-theoretic ("unconditional") rather than based on computational assumptions. A particular class of such protocols is constructed, for which the different keys correspond to different, secret, quantum error detecting codes. The codes correspond to points on an algebraic curve over a finite field. These protocols have probability of undetected tampering inverse in the number of keys, which is better than the classical bound of inverse in the square root of the number of keys. They are efficient in that the required key length for a given security parameter (negative log of probability of undetected tampering) grows only logarithmically in message size, while the security parameter grows linearly with key size. Thus their security and efficiency are similar to, but even stronger than, those of the classical Wegman-Carter protocols.
Introduction
Reliably ensuring that a communication comes from its purported sender, or that stored data has not been tampered with, is an important problem in classical communications networks and data storage systems. The analogous problem, of assuring oneself that a quantum state received over a quantum communications network or stored in quantum memory has come from its purported sender, could also become important if quantum computation or other forms of quantum information-processing ever come into use. Wegman and Carter [1] [2] showed how to transfer security associated with a secret key to the authentication of a message much longer than the key, if secrecy of the message is not a concern. While the probability of an adversary getting the recipient to accept a message different from the authentic one may be greater than the probability of guessing the secret key, it is not too much greater; the secret key still gives good control over the probability of successful tampering. In this paper, I give a method for achieving a similar assurance of authenticity for quantum messages. For a protocol from this class, the set of keys is a set of quantum error detecting codes, chosen in a particular geometric fashion. A quantum state is encoded in one of these codes, and the state rejected as inauthentic if an error is detected by the recipient. The geometry of the set of codes ensures that any given error from a "unitary error basis" is undetectable in at most a small fraction of the codes. This ensures that a forger who does not know which code was used is very likely to be detected. This gives an upper bound on the probability of undetected tampering is inverse in the number of keys, which is better than the classical bound of inverse in the square root of this number. Moreover, as with the classical Wegman-Carter schemes, the security parameter drops only logarithmically with message size, allowing efficient authentication in the sense that the message may be exponentially longer than the key before security drops significantly.
Independently and concurrently, Claude Crépeau, Daniel Gottesman, Adam Smith and Alain Tapp [3] have investigated quantum data authentication, using ideas from error correction and quantum cryptography, also including the idea of a randomly chosen error detecting code. We had discussions at various times during the development of our protocols, but decided the results and approaches were different enough that separate publications would make sense. While also exploiting the idea of a randomly chosen error detecting code, they obtain complementary results that shed light on the interesting relationship between secrecy and authentication in quantum mechanics: their codes achieve both perfect quantum secrecy and a given degree of authentication, and meet a lower bound on the key length of codes that do both these tasks, whereas the codes considered herein meet a lower bound on the key length of schemes aimed solely at authentication. Debbie Leung's work [4] on key recycling in quantum encryption can also be interpreted as providing quantum data authentication, without incidental encryption, as can the initial phase of some quantum key distribution protocols, although these methods (discussed further in Section 6 do not beat the classical bound relating key length and security parameter.
Section 2 discusses classical authentication codes. It provides background for those interested in comparing the present codes to classical ones, but may be skipped by those interested only in the quantum construction. Section 3 defines a notion of quantum message authentication code (QMAC). Section 4 introduces the idea of a quantum stabilizer code-based QMAC, and reviews the part of the theory of stabilizer quantum error-correction codes which is relevant for these QMACs (and might be skipped by experts on stabilizer codes). In Section 5, a particular class of stabilizer QMACs is constructed from normal rational curves on the projective geometries of finite vector spaces, and the QMACs thus constructed are shown to have the strong security properties described above. Section 6 discusses the relation of quantum message authentication to other quantum cryptographic protocols such as quantum key distribution and the encryption of quantum states, and concludes.
Classical authentication codes
I begin with a very general discussion of classical message authentication codes (MACs) paralleling that in [5] (except that Maurer also considers multiple-use codes.) Define a MAC to be a finite set M of messages m, a finite set C of ciphertexts c, and a set K of keys k, an encoding rule (possibly stochastic) which gives a distribution for ciphertext c depending on k, m, and a decoding rule, again possibly stochastic, giving a distribution over the union of the message space with an additional symbol "FAIL," depending on c, k. The symbol "FAIL" is supposed to represent the detection by the recipient of tampering with the intended message. Most authors require that the decoded symbol (message m ′ , or FAIL symbol) be determined by the ciphertext c, in a manner which is nonstochastic. Maurer, in particular, requires:
The ciphertext and key uniquely determine the sent message m.
That is, if there has been no tampering, the message may be inferred with certainty. This would seem to rule out stochastic decoding. Maurer states that this is "without loss of generality." It is indeed plausible that stochastic decoding is always suboptimal, but since the situation may be game-theoretic, care is warranted since in game theory, mixed strategies may be equilibria. The examples of authentication codes considered here will have deterministic decoding. The term ciphertext suggests that after encoding, the message is to some extent secret; although this may be the case, it need not be so and in a classical system, no secrecy is necessary for extremely secure authentication. (In fact, I think it is never necessary to use secrecy to increase security, and is probably generally inefficient.) An attack on such a system consists of a forgery rule, possibly stochastic, which gives, for each ciphertext c, a distribution over ciphertexts. Various notions of success probability may be considered, but we will focus on the weakest. The success probability for an attack on message m is the total probability (over the random choice of key, as well as any other stochastic processes involved) that, when the encoding rule, forgery rule, and decoding rule are applied to m, it is decoded to a message m ′ = m, and not to "FAIL". (Note that when stochastic decoding is involved, this may be nonzero even for the forgery rule which consists in doing nothing.) We will consider only the noise-free situation, so that any errors in decoding are due either to tampering, or design features of the system. With deterministic decoding, and a system in which the key and ciphertext uniquely determine the message, there are only two types of error to consider. Type I consists in accepting the received m ′ as authentic when it is not what was sent. Type II consists in rejecting m ′ when it is what was sent.
If each message also corresponds to a unique ciphertext, then the authentication system is usually termed "Cartesian". Under this condition, it provides no secrecy. Much of the literature has been restricted to the Cartesian case. There may be good reason for this: it is probably the case that non-Cartesian schemes require more key to achieve the same level of authentication. The idea is that there is likely to be a tradeoff between the use of key for authentication and for secrecy: one does not imply the other.
To illustrate the workings of classical authentication protocols, we present a particular type of Cartesian classical authentication scheme, an authentication tag system [6] . Define an authentication tag system to be a set M of messages, a set T of tags, and a publicly known set F of functions f : M → T . The choice of an f ∈ F is the shared classical secret key of the protocol. The protocol proceeds by the sender choosing a message m, calculating its authentication tag f (m), and sending both m and f (m) to the recipient on a public channel. The recipient recieves some pair g 1 (m, f (m)) ∈ M , g 2 (m, f (m)) ∈ T , which are equal to m, f (m) unless they have been tampered with. (The function g is thus a (deterministic) forgery rule. More generally, we would let g 1 ∈ M, g 2 ∈ T be distributed according to an (m, f (m))-dependent probability distribution.) The recipient calculates f (m ′ ); if the calculated tag f (m ′ ) of the received message is equal to the received tag f (m) ′ , then he accepts the message as genuine. The protocol works because without knowing f , it is very hard to find another message-tag pair m ′ ,f (m ′ ) even given knowledge of one pair m, f (m). Call an authentication tag system p-secure if for any message m and function g : M × T → M × T the probability (over a uniform random choice of f from F ) that g(m, f (m)) is a valid message tag-pair (equals m ′ , f (m ′ ) for some m ′ = m) is less than p. The minimum p for which the system is p-secure is defined to be the "error probability", p e . This is the type I error for testing the hypothesis that the state has been substituted by an incorrect state. (The tag system is designed so that the probability of type II error is zero.) Often, we will refer to the security level, defined by the exponential security parameter ǫ := − log p e . Highsecurity protocols are obtained from universal 2 (or almost-universal 2 ) families of hash functions: sets of K functions from M elements to T elements such that the fraction of functions taking a given m to a given t is K/T (or 2K/T ). Given an input-output pair (observed by a forger in an insecure channel, say), we still have probability only T /K of guessing the correct function. To make it hard to guess the function from an input-output pair, we need every pair which is an input-output pair for one function in the class to also be an input-output pair for a large number of functions in the class, for once we know the input-output pair we need only guess among that large number of functions. But we still cannot have this large number of functions be most of the class-for if it is a substantial fraction of the class, then this input-output pair will be a valid message-tag pair independent of the key, and so a forger will be able to substitute it for a different pair with little chance of being caught. It is the interplay between these two considerations which gives a bound of 1/ √ K, rather than 1/K, for the failure probability of a classical MAC.
As an example, the set of all linear functions from (F q ) m to (F q ) t is universal 2 , but it it is undesirably large, since there are q mt such functions (mt matrix entries drawn from F q ). Wegman and Carter constructed "efficient" almost-universal classes of hash functions from "inefficient" ones by a construction involving breaking the input string into subsections much shorter than the overall message, and calculating a tag for each of the subsections using inefficient hash functions, and then applying this same procedure to the concatenation of the resulting tags until there is only one tag left.
They also used the notion of universal n classes of hash functions to obtain multipleuse hash functions. In such a class, observing n input-output pairs still gives one probability no better than about 1/K 1 n+1 of guessing another input-output pair. Thus for classical schemes designed for a fixed number of repeated uses, as the number of uses the scheme is designed for increases, the behavior of the bound on the failure probability approaches 1/K, but for no fixed n is this behavior attained. In contrast, the quantum protocols presented below have error probability going as 1/K even for single-use protocols. The obvious attack of just randomly guessing the key makes it clear that this bound is tight, so there is less incentive for investigating multiple-use quantum protocols.
The idea of authentication tag schemes, and some bounds and constructions, first appeared in print in [6] ; the problem was suggested to them by Gus Simmons. Wegman and Carter [1] gave the first efficient family of schemes, in the sense that the schemes are O(2 − log |T | )-secure, that is, exponentially secure in the key bit-length log |T |, for fixed message bit-length log |M | while having only very slow growth of the required key-size to attain a fixed security parameter, as the message bit-length grows.
Quantum data authentication
Definition 1: A quantum message authentication code with classical key (QMAC) will consist of finite-dimensional message Hilbert space M and cipher Hilbert space C.
(Where it will cause no confusion, I will also denote by M and C the dimensions of M and C.) An encoding will be a trace-preserving completely positive (TPCP) map E k chosen from a set K of such maps from B(M ) to B(C), the spaces of linear operators on M and C. (We could also consider schemes with arbitrary, not even necessarily linear, trace-preserving encoding maps from B(M ) to B(C); this corresponds to "preparation visible" encoding.) A decoding will be a pair of trace-decreasing CP maps D k , F k , which sum to a trace-preserving one, from B(C) to B(M ). These represent a keydependent measurement with two outcomes, corresponding to the two maps: D k , which represents the "no tampering" measurement result, and F k , which is interepreted as indicating tampering (F for "forgery", or "FAIL"). If "no tampering" is obtained, the state produced by the map D k , renormalized to have unit trace, results, and is accepted as the authentic state transmitted by the sender. We suppose that between encoding and decoding, a forger may perform an arbitrary TPCP map A on the system C.
We also note that a quantum authentication code with quantum and classical key may be defined. In such a system, Alice and Bob could share a (possibly entangled) state ρ AB k of a quantum key system Q ≡ AB; this could even depend on the value of the classical key, as the subscript indicates. Encoding and decoding maps would then be CP-maps from AM → AC (encoding) and from BC → BM (decoding). For example, a scheme with classical keys k chosen with probabilities p k may be used as the basis for a scheme with only quantum key. The quantum scheme is to have Alice and Bob share an entangled key state k p 1/2 k |k A |k B , and perform a quantum-coherent version of the classical protocol on this superposition of shared orthogonal "classical" key states |k .
We now specialize to a particular, slightly simpler type of QMAC with classical key.
A quantum authentication tag system will consist of finite-dimensional message and tag Hilbert spaces M and T , and a publicly known set of unitaries, indexed by a finite set K, acting on M ⊗ T . To use such a system, the sender and recipient secretly agree on some k ∈ K and a standard state |0 T ∈ T . Then the sender prepares his desired message |ψ ∈ M , applies U k , and sends the result U k |ψ M |0 T to the recipient. The recipient applies U † k , and measures T in a basis containing |0 T , accepting the state of M as authentic if the result corresponding to |0 T is obtained.
We suppose a forger may perform an arbitrary quantum operation A ∼ {A i } between the encoding and decoding, with the object of substituting for the state U k |ψ |0 a state with high probability of passing Bob's test, but such that upon passing the test, the state of M does not have high fidelity to |ψ . After the encoding with U k , forgery with A, and decoding with U † k , the overall state of M T will be:
Define the probability of failure, or probability of successful tampering, p f to be the least p such that for any state |ψ ∈ M and any forging operation A,
For high security, we wish p f to be small, preferably of order 1/T =: 2 −t , which should be of order 1/K =: 2 −k as well. That is, the component of the output state which passes the authentication test but does not lie along the authentic state, is negligible, exponentially small in the classical key information k := log K. The exponential security parameter is − log p f . (A weaker security criterion would be to average uniformly over states |ψ in the above. The criterion above is extremely strong, insofar as it must hold even if the operation A is selected by a forger who knows |ψ .)
Stabilizer coding and authentication
The quantum message authentication codes we introduce in this paper are constructed using quantum error correcting codes. A QMAC of this type is a publicly known set of K quantum error correcting codes; Alice and Bob have secretly agreed on one of these codes. The identity of this code is the key value. The number of key bits is thus log K. Each of these codes is a subspace, large enough to contain the quantum message, of a larger Hilbert space, together with a particular isometry from the message space into the code subspace, which is used to encode the state. The codes are used in error detection mode: the recipient checks to see if the state of the quantum system is still in the code subspace; if not, it is rejected as inauthentic, while if it is, it is decoded via the inverse of the encoding isometry, and Bob accepts it as authentic. In order to construct such QMACs with high security, we will use the most wellstudied kind of quantum codes, stabilizer codes. We will assume the basic quantum systems have prime dimension q (for q=2, this is the familiar case of qubits).
Definition 1 A stabilizer QMAC is a set of K quantum stabilizer codes on M ⊗ T , where M has dimension q m and T has dimension q t , i.e. M and T may be thought of as consisting of m q-ary quantum systems and t q-ary quantum systems respectively. Each code will encode m q-ary systems, that is, it will be of dimension q m , just large enough to contain states of M .
In the remainder of this section we review the theory behind stabilizer codes for q-ary systems; readers familiar with this material may wish to skip this subsection, or skim it for notation.
In studying and constructing codes for correcting or detecting quantum errors, it is useful to represent error processes in terms of unitary bases for the space of operators on the channel Hilbert space. One such is the "shift/phase" error basis on d-dimensional Hilbert space, defined via:
where i|S|j := δ i,j−1 , i|P |j := ξ i δ i,j , are the standard-basis matrix elements of the "shift by one" and "ramp the phase by one" operators. (Here, indices are in the ring of integers mod d.) This basis has appeared regularly in mathematics, and also physics. Its operators represent a natural unitary (rather than Hermitian) generalization of the Pauli matrices to higher dimension. As far as I am aware, they were introduced into quantum information theory, in [7] , for teleportation on d-dimensional systems. The theory of nice error bases, of which the shift-phase bases are a special case, was developed and used by Knill in [8] and [9] . In general, my exposition will follow Knill.
One usually represents an error process by a completely positive linear map, which may be written in a "Hellwig-Kraus (HK) decomposition", as ρ → A(ρ) = i A i ρA † i , for some set of operators A i satisfying i A † i A i = I. But the A i , although not unique, depend on the operation: the HK decomposition does not express any operation in terms of a fixed set of operators. Expand the operation A in a fixed operator basis E i as:
The condition that A be completely positive (have an HK decomposition) is then that a ij be a positive matrix, as may be verified by expanding the A k in the basis E i . Operators, although they form a Hilbert space, have the additional structure of an algebra-a vector space with product having nice relations to the vector space structure. This is relevant, since we care about what happens when different operations succeed each other, and when successive operations are expanded in an operator basis, the operator components are multiplied. The additional structure means that different orthonormal operator bases are less similar than different bases of an arbitrary Hilbert space: they are distinguished by properties involving the interaction of the product and the Hilbert-space structure. Unitarity of the basis operators is such a property, useful because inner-product preservation under error operators and products of these helps keep track of probabilities and probability amplitudes. We will want a further property: the product of two error operators is, up to a phase factor, another operator from the basis. This is Knill's condition of niceness of a unitary error basis. It removes the need for a diagonalization process in analyzing the composition of operations (for example, the composition of encoding, noise or tampering, and decoding). Formally, an orthonormal error basis E i is nice if
where i * j is a binary operation on the index set. Knill shows that the α ij are complex phase factors (have unit modulus) and the product i * j is a group operation on the indices (we will call this group the index group). He also shows that by choosing each E i to have unit determinant (an arbitrary basis can be chosen with this form just by multiplying each operator by a phase factor), the α ij become d-th roots of unity, and the error basis is said to be very nice.
Thus, a nice error basis generates a group E of unitary operators; the center Z(E) of this group (the set of operators which commute with all operators of the group) is made up of scalar multiples of the identity. The scalars are d-th roots of unity, if the basis is very nice. Dividing out the center gives a quotient group, which we denote E, isomorphic to the index group. Each element of this quotient group corresponds to one operator in the error basis (it corresponds to a coset of the center which has this operator as representative, in other words, it corresponds to the operator modulo phase.) E is a central extension of E by Z(E). Also, since E is given as a set of unitary operators, these form a faithful unitary representation of E, and a projective representation of the index group E. These closely related aspects of unitary error bases, as central extensions and as projective representations, may be studied using the theory of group cohomology, with the goal of characterizing the possible nice error bases, and the groups that may occur as index groups, etc... although we will not need this theory here [10] , [11] .
For the shift/phase basis, the group E is generated by S, P . A more explicit form for this error basis is i|E ab |j = δ i,j−a ξ bi . The index group of these bases is the product of two copies of the cyclic group of order d. For any unitary error basis, the commutator
Thus the commutator subgroup is Abelian, and is in the center. The commutator is uniquely determined by the map it induces from the pairs of indices i, j to the phase factors α ij α ji . The commutation structure of E is thus fully described by a function from E × E to the unit-modulus complex numbers. The group E is nonabelian, but in the very common case where the index group is the product of an Abelian group and its dual 1 (the shift/phase basis providing one example, since the cyclic group is self-dual), the commutation map E is determined by a symplectic form B, sometimes called "bicharacter," on the index group [12] , [10] . That is, writing the index group additively, B is alternating:
bilinear (the linearity looks nonstandard because the relevant Abelian group structure of the unit modulus complex numbers is written multiplicatively):
and nondegenerate:
If B(x, y) = 1 for all x, then y = 1.
The form has values in the complex unit circle. But if the error basis is very nice on a p n dimensional Hilbert space, the values will be p-th roots of unity, and we may instead use a form with values in F p , substituting addition in F p for the isomorphic multiplicative group generated by a primitive p-th root of unity in S 1 . The symplectic conditions then look more standard (since they are equivalent to saying that for a fixed y ∈ E, B(·, y) and B(y, ·) are homomorphisms into the additive group of F p ). Explicitly 1 The dual of an Abelian group G is the group of homomorphisms of G into S 1 . In other words, it is the group of characters of G.
(retaining the name B for the symplectic form):
The set of all tensor products E i ⊗ F j of operators of nice error bases E i and F j on two spaces is a nice error basis for the tensor product of the spaces. (The same holds with "nice" replaced by "very nice.") To analyze p n -ary quantum codes, a standard approach is to use as an error basis the n-fold tensor products of the p-ary error basis. The index group may be identified with the additive group of the 2n-dimensional vector space over F p ; this is equipped with an F p -valued symplectic form. This structure is useful in constructing quantum error-correcting codes, and analyzing which errors from the unitary error basis they can detect or correct. The phase of an error operator is irrelevant to whether it can be corrected or detected, so it is adequate to represent errors by their indices. Tensor product bases are often useful because the tensor factors may model physical subsystems, and the error structure be related to this subsytem structure on physical grounds. For example, 'high-weight" errors affecting many subsystems at once may be infrequent. No such physical motivation is used in this paper, though, because the attacker is assumed able to do any error operator, indeed any trace-preserving CP map. The role of the tensor product structure of the quantum system is rather to help provide tractable mathematical constructions, through the natural relation of the tensor product of q-ary quantum systems to certain finite geometries. The commutation structure, given by the symplectic form, is important because a very important way of specifying quantum error-correcting codes is by specifying Abelian subgroups of the error group. If such a subgroup has m independent generators, each one has q possible eigenvalues, and each one of the q m possible sequences of m eigenvalues (one eigenvalue for each of the the m generators) corresponds to a q n−m -dimensional subspace of Hilbert space. This is the space of vectors which are simultaneously eigenvectors of each of the m generators, with the specified eigenvalues. These q m subspaces are orthogonal, and one of them (usually the one with all eigenvalues 1) may be chosen as the quantum code H 0 k , where the quantum state is to be placed, and the others will be "syndromes" representing different possible places a noise process may take the coded state. Error detection is achieved by measuring whether the state is still in the code or not; correction is achieved by measuring which of the syndrome spaces the state is in, and for each result, mapping the state isometrically back into the code subspace (the choice of these isometries partially determines which errors may be corrected).
In terms of the geometry of the index group, viewed as a symplectic space, the set of generators for the Abelian subgroup which defines a quantum code corresponds to a basis for a totally isotropic subspace C of the index space. A totally isotropic subspace is one for which for any x, y in the subspace, B(x, y) = 0. Thus total isotropy of C ensures the corresponding subgroup of E is Abelian. Since states in the code Hilbert subspace H 0 are simultaneous eigenstates of all the stabilizer operators, errors S with index in C act as the identity on such states ("stabilize" H 0 pointwise, whence the name "stabilizer codes"). Errors X with index in C ⊥ commute with every stabilizer operator S, so they satisfy SX|ψ = XS|ψ = X|ψ for states |ψ ∈ H 0 , whence X|ψ is in H 0 . If in addition X's index is not in C itself, we know it does not act as the identity on H 0 , although it keeps the state within H 0 . It is an "undetectable error" in the strong sense of "error": undetectable because it keeps things within the code, error because it does not act as the identity. Thus the set of undetectable errors for a stabilizer code C is precisely C ⊥ − C.
5 Stabilizer-based authentication codes from normal rational curves
To construct authentication protocols with |M | = q m , |T | = q t , we will use tensor products of operators from a q m -ary error basis with operators from a q t -ary error basis. Our construction will require t to divide (m + t). Thus m is a multiple of t, say m =:rt; then m + t = rt, where r :=r + 1. Thus the overall finite vector space is V (2rt, q). We will want to specify some number K of t-spaces (keys). For our construction, it will be useful to view V (2rt, q) as the finite field F q 2rt . This is done via a bijection between the Galois field of order p n and the vector space of dimension n over F p . Such a bijection is chosen in the usual construction of F p n as an extension field of F p . (The choice corresponds to a choice of irreducible polynomial over F p .) The bijection identifies a particular occurrence of F p as a subfield of F p n with the scalars (which are elements of F p ) in the vector space structure. Under this "canonical" bijection, addition in the vector space V (n, q) maps to addition in the field F p n ; scalar multiplication in the vector space maps to field multiplication of an arbitrary field element (corresponding to any element of the vector space) on the right, by an element of (the canonical occurrence of) the subfield F p on the left. Such a standard bijection exists even if p is not prime, but rather equal to q n for some prime q. Thus we may view F q 2rt as an extension field of F q t , or as an extension field of F q , via canonical bijections between the field and either V (2rt, q) or V (2r, q t ). We consider a normal rational curve in P G(2r − 1, q t ) (the projective geometry whose points are the 1-d subspaces of V (2r, q t )). (See, e.g., the excellent introductory text [13] .) Such a curve is given by:
Here y ranges over F q t and the colon is used to separate the coordinates of a projective point, to indicate that all that matters is their ratio. Each of these q t + 1 1-spaces of V (2r, q t ) corresponds to a t-space of V (2rt, q), via composition of canonical bijections between these spaces and F q 2rt . Formally, this correspondence is given by a map
The notation expr(α) α refers to the linear span of those elements given by the expression expr(α), as α takes all its possible values. For each argument x of this map, α ranges over all those elements of F q 2rt which are in the canonical occurence of F q t as a subfield of F q 2rt . There are a total of q t + 1 such spaces, each corresponding to a quantum code encoding (r − 1)t q-ary systems into r q-ary systems.
The main result of this paper is the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (a) The q t + 1 t-subspaces C k of V (2rt, q) corresponding to the q t + 1 points of the normal rational curve Υ on P G(2r, q t ), constitute a quantum stabilizer message authentication code encoding (r − 1)t q-ary systems into rt q-ary systems.
(b) This message authentication code has failure probability less than
Proof: (a) By our definition of a quantum stabilizer QMAC, we need only show that the t-spaces C k are totally isotropic. For by the standard construction of stabilizer codes over q-ary quantum alphabets outlined in the previous section, this will imply that each one gives rise to a quantum stabilizer code with the stated parameters. To do this, we introduce a symplectic form that makes all the C k totally isotropic. Define, on F q 2rt , the symplectic form
This is also a symplectic form on V (2rt, F q ), under the canonical correspondence with F q 2rt . Now, (αx, βy) = tr αx(βy) q rt − βy(αx)
(We have used the fact that F * s , the multiplicative group of F s , is cyclic of order s − 1, so α s = α. In particular, α q rt = α and β q rt = β.) Fix an x ∈ C k − {0}. Every y ∈ C k may be written as αx, for some α ∈ F q t . Now (x, x) = 0. So, (αx, βx) = 0, i.e., C k is totally isotropic under the symplectic form (13) .
(b) We begin by establishing the stated security level against "Pauli attacks," and then a simple lemma extends it to general attacks. (A Pauli attack is one for which the forgery operation A has the generalized Pauli form. That is, it has a Hellwig-Kraus decomposition { √ p x E x } in terms of the shift/phase (often called "generalized Pauli")
error basis E x .) For stabilizer QMACs, the set of possible codes is a K-set of of tdimensional totally isotropic subspaces C k indexed by k. We ask: for a given error index (vector in V (2(m + t), q)), what is an upper bound on the number of C ⊥ k − C k it can belong to? For C ⊥ k − C k is precisely the set of errors undetectable by code k. So if we divide this upper bound by the number K of codes, we have bounded the maximum, over all errors the forger might choose, of the probability (with respect to a uniform random choice of code) of the error's going undetected.
An upper bound on the number of C ⊥ k an error can belong to is also an upper bound on the number of C ⊥ k − C k it can belong to, and since |C k | is small compared to |C ⊥ k | in our context, it will be a good enough bound. Consider an arbitrary error operator E x corresponding to x ∈ V (2(m + t), q). x ∈ C ⊥ k means B(x, y) = 0 for all y ∈ C k . For t y's each in a different one-dimensional subspace of C k , these linear equations will be independent. So, each C k for which x ∈ C ⊥ k knocks out dim(C k ) ≡ t subspaces of the overall space as possible basis vectors of a subspace containing x. For a good bound, we want a construction such that as we add more values of k the equations B(x, y i ) = 0 for y i ∈ C k are linearly independent from the equations for earlier values of k (until we reach the total dimension's worth of equations and this is no longer possible). Then it will quickly become inconsistent to assume x ∈ C ⊥ k for too many values of k, because we will quickly impose more than the overall dimension's worth of linearly independent equations on x. In other words, we want the 1-d subspaces in k P G(C k ) to be in general position. A set of points in a projective geometry of dimension d − 1 are said to be in general position if any d (= dimension of the underlying vector space, when, as in our case, such exists) of them are linearly independent. The points on the normal rational curve Υ are in general position. (To verify this one shows that for any 2r points on the curve, the determinant of the matrix of their coordinates is nonzero; these are easily evaluated Vandermonde determinants. More abstractly, the proposition follows from the fact that the curve is a quasi-projective variety of degree 2r, though the calculation establishing this is essentially the same.) The normal rational curve is a particularly good source of such points for our purposes, because it gives us a very large-probably as large as possible-set of points in general position, which means that the ratio of the maximal number of codes in which an error can be undetectable to the total number of codes is low.
The upshot is that any 2r points on Υ are linearly independent. Each point k on Υ corresponds (via the canonical bijection σ) to a t-dimensional subspace C k of V (2rt, q). Let z be a fixed element of C k . As α ranges over F q t , αz ranges over all vectors in C k . So, to say that any 2r 1-subspaces of V (2r, q t ) are linearly independent is also to say that any 2rt points in V (2rt, q) gotten by taking 2r points on Υ and multiplying by elements of F q t −{0}, are linearly independent in V (2rt, q). Hence a given x ∈ V (2rt, q) can satisfy x ∈ C k for at most 2r values of k, when C k are chosen among the q t + 1 available t-spaces corresponding to points on Υ. Recall that r =r + 1, wherer = m/t is the number of message systems per tag system. So for any error,
The same bound obviously holds for a "generalized Pauli" attack in which a unitary error operator E i is applied with probability p i (or any attack giving rise to an operation with that Hellwig-Kraus decomposition). Explicitly, omitting the identity (since its inclusion by the attacker can only decrease the probability of successful tampering), we have 2
By Lemma 1 (proved below) this bound on p f applies for general trace-preserving CP-map attacks A as well.
2 To forestall confusion note that prob(i ∈ C ⊥ k ) in the expression below is is equal to 1 or 0, as i ∈ C ⊥ k or not-i.e., it's the characteristic function of C ⊥ k evaluated on i.
Defining the security parameter ǫ := − log p f , we see that ǫ ≥ log (q t + 1) − log (m/t + 1) − log 2 ≥ log q t − log (m/t) = t log q − log m + log t. (17) That is, security is (slightly super-)linear in the tag length. As in the Wegman-Carter case, for fixed t security eventually drops to zero with message length, but only logarithmically in message length. The error probability is inversely related to the number of keys, rather than to the square root of the number of keys as in a classical bound. We now prove the lemma which reduces the security of a stabilizer QMAC against arbitrary attacks to its security against Pauli attacks.
Lemma 1 For any stabilizer QMAC, its probability of failure under arbitrary TPCPmap attacks is bounded above by its probability of failure under generalized Pauli attacks.
Proof: We use the representation of quantum operations from Knill and LaFlamme's "Concatenated Quantum Codes' [9] via:
where the |a i are (not necessarily orthogonal or normalized) states of an "environment", the A i linear operators. This induces a CP map on density operators, also denoted by A, given by
The matrix a with elements a ij := a i |a j is positive since it is a matrix of inner products ("Gram matrix"), and diagonalizing it generates a Hellwig-Kraus representation for the operation. A is derived from a unitary operator, via U QE |0 E |ψ = i |a i A i |ψ , if and only if |A|ψ | = 1 for all |ψ . This is equivalent to
This is the usual trace-preserving condition; when the A i are a Hellwig-Kraus decomposition it is the familiar i A † i A i = I. Trace-preservation implies i e i |e i = 1. For any operation A and any basis {A i } of the space of operators, a representation of the form (19) exists. For our analysis, we let the A i be the E i , our nice error basis, and denote the corresponding environment states by |e i . Thus A(ρ) = ij e i |e j E j ρE † i . Each stabilizer code C k induces a partition of the error basis into undetectable errors with index in C ⊥ k , and detectable errors with index in V − C ⊥ k . (The errors with index in C ⊥ k include operators which, while they are errors in the sense of being nonidentity operators of the error basis, act as the identity on the code H k . As already mentioned, we overestimate the probability of successful tampering by lumping them with the rest of the errors in C ⊥ k , which have nontrivial action on the code H k , but this will still give us a reasonable bound.) We may write the probability of error when code C k is used as
Here, |ψ k ∈ H k is the encoded version of the input state |ψ , encoded with code k. P k is the projector onto H k . The last equality holds because for a stabilizer code, the detectable errors (the ones not in C ⊥ k ) take the state into a syndrome space orthogonal to the code subspace, while the undetectable ones leave it normalized and wholly within the code subspace.
Hence,
C ⊥ k is just the complement of C ⊥ k : the set of detectable errors. (The last equality just uses trace-preservation of the overall operation of forgery followed by error detection; essentially, it is just the statement that the probabilities of the answers "pass" and "fail" in Bob's authentication step sum to one.) By the inequality ||x + y|| 2 ≥ ||x|| 2 + ||y|| 2 applied to the subtracted term, this is bounded above by
By trace-preservation of the operation A, e i |e i are probabilities p i , so the same bounds as for a generalized Pauli operation apply to p f .
Discussion

Key distribution and authentication
What is the relation of these data authentication codes to quantum key distribution protocols? Certain QKD protocols, particularly those introduced by Deutsch, Ekert, Jozsa, Macchiavello, Popescu and Sanpera [14] , (DEJMPS), and further developed by Lo and Chau [15] for their security proof, appear to transmit half of a maximally entangled state, authenticate the transmission using entanglement purification, and then use the correlations between measurements on halves of the entangled state to provide classical key. However, entanglement purification requires some public discussion. This must be conducted via an authenticated classical channel. Other QKD protocols also require classical discussion. Thus QKD is most cleanly viewed as a way of turning an authentic classical channel into a secret classical channel-impossible, classically, when adversaries have unlimited computational power. The entanglement distribution-andpurification version of QKD may be seen as turning an authentic classical channel and a quantum channel into an authentic quantum channel, and then using the latter (with, possibly, more use of the authentic classical channel) to obtain a secret classical channel. As Bennett noted [16] , QKD can be part of a protocol in which some classical seed key is used to breed a much larger quantity of classical secret key. The seed key authenticates the classical discussion. If such a QKD protocol proceeded by first establishing the authenticity of a maximally entangled state, it would achieve one potential goal of the present data authentication codes: using classical key to authenticate the sharing of an entangled state. One could then use the entangled state to teleport a quantum state (requiring further authenticated classical communication). Two further points need to be made about such use of the Deutsch et. al./Lo and Chau type QKD protocols to achieve quantum authentication. The first point is that in these protocols, the classical discussion is two-way. Hence they cannot be used for authenticated storage, in which transmission is from the past to the future of the same system, and there is no way to do two-way purification. The second point is that the QKD-inspired protocols achieve something stronger than what is required of a QMAC: at the end of the QKD-inspired protocol, both Alice and Bob know that successful transmission has been achieved, whereas in a QMAC, only Bob knows. Of course, a QMAC can be extended to achieve the stronger form of authentication wherein both parties know when they have succeeded. This is done by Bob's using classical authentication (or quantum authentication of the classical message, which may be more efficient) to let Alice know the protocol succeeded. Even though only one bit is transmitted backwards, a large key may still be required for high security authentication of this transmission as well. Key size will be nearly doubled over the one-way version. (It is only a near-doubling since the initial Alice-to-Bob quantum communication required a slightly longer key to authenticate, because it involved a longer message.) Relatively little has been done to quantify the relationship between the amount of classical seed key used, the amount of classical key or quantum pre-key authenticated, and the security level with which it is authenticated. For the QMAC protocols introduced here, we have addressed this matter explicitly.
For QKD protocols, the amount of classical seed key can also be much smaller than the amount of key generated by the protocol. The bred key is not a one-time pad, for one attack is to guess the seed key, and this succeeds with probability much greater than the failure probability of a true one-time pad as long as the bred key. But that probability may still be small enough. The important thing is that for any fixed δ, the probability of getting information δ about a message encrypted with the bred key is inverse exponential in the seed key length, despite the message being much longer than the seed key. And this is not possible, information-theoretically, via a classical protocol. Shannon showed that any classical way of using s seed key bits, still leaves m − s bits of information about the message in the clear.
We now consider the reverse possibility: that of using our QMAC's for quantum key distribution. In contrast to standard QKD, here classical "seed" key is used in the quantum protocol from the outset. As in standard QKD, it may seed a much larger quantum "proto-key". For data authentication will protect not only pure states of M , but also the entanglement of M with a system R which Alice keeps. Alice and Bob, after satisfying themselves that M has not been tampered with, may obtain shared key by each measuring their system in the appropriate basis, secure-although with failure probability inverse exponential in the number of seed key bits-in the knowledge that their measurement results are likely to be perfectly correlated. Of course, in order to use the system in this way, Bob must communicate the success of the QMAC to Alice, with the attendant near-doubling of the key required. It would be interesting to compare such key distribution to more standard protocols such as BB84 [17] , the six-state protocol [18] , [19] , or the obvious generalizations which use all the states of sets of mutually unbiased bases in a p n -dimensional system [20] , with regard to efficiency in the use of classical seed key and quantum communication.
Secrecy and authentication
In [21] and [22] it is shown that 2x classical key bits are necessary and sufficient to encrypt x qubits of quantum information perfectly securely, transforming any state to the perfectly mixed state, when averaged over possible encryption keys. It is also shown that a unitary chosen uniformly from any orthonormal basis of unitary operators for the quantum system may serve as key. Because our QMACs appear to be using the information-disturbance properties of quantum-mechanics, one might surmise that ensuring a state's authenticity is equivalent to encrypting it. For data authentication, the density operator of the encoded state is not uniform, so the secrecy is not perfect. The probability of successfully using a perfectly secrecy-encrypted quantum state in some further task, without knowledge of the key, is bounded above by 1/d. But the probability of successfully using a state encoded with a QMAC is no less than the probability of guessing the MAC key, which may be above 1/d. Is the degree of secrecy incidentally achieved by a QMAC at least as great as, or simply related to, its degree of authenticicity? If so, this would be a peculiarly quantum relationship between secrecy and authenticity, since in classical authentication secrecy and authenticity crowd each other out (for fixed key length), rather than going together.
Debbie Leung [4] has investigated the recycling of quantum key (entangled qubits) and classical key (perfectly correlated secret bits) in quantum encryption schemes. Here the goal is to ensure that key can be reused if tests indicated no eavesdropping has taken place. Some of her results also give authentication schemes for quantum messages. The tests that permit key recycling at a certain security level also assure authenticity of the message with at least that security level. The resulting schemes are quite practical since they do not require incidental perfect encryption, and have key lengths (and extra communication requirements) linear in the security parameter r (although they do not beat the bound of 2r for classical schemes).
Conclusion
We defined codes for authenticated communication or storage of quantum messages or data, using sets of stabilizer codes derived from an algebraic curve over a Galois field. Their security level drops only logarithmically with message length, allowing efficient authentication of long messages with small keys as in the classical WegmanCarter schemes. They are single-use authentication codes, and the error probability is bounded above by a function proportional to the inverse of the number K of keys. This bound is tight up to a constant, since the attack of just guessing the key succeeds with probability 1/K. It is better than the classical bound of inverse square-root of the number of keys. Thus by quantum means, one may also authenticate classical data more efficiently than classically possible. Does the less stringent requirement of reconstituting classical messages, rather than quantum ones, allow still more efficient quantum protocols? The tightness of the bound means that this could give at best a constant factor improvement in key length. Although we have not investigated multipleuse quantum authentication schemes, there is less incentive to do so in the quantum case because unlike in the classical situation, it seems unlikely one will gain much efficiency in key rate from multiple-use schemes-the 1/K bound applies regardless of the number of uses the scheme is designed to be secure for.
